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 these other philosophers more clearly than they did themselves. What is
 more, he also develops those ideas further than anyone else I can think of,
 adding his own insights as he goes along. The result is a coherent and
 compelling defense of second-orderism. I would certainly recommend
 this book to any philosopher interested in ontological commitment or
 second-order logic, and given its clarity, I would recommend Part II to
 students as well. —Robert Trueman, Robinson College, Cambridge
 LUMSDEN, Simon. Self-consciousness and the C7~itique of the Subject: Hegel,
 Heidegger, and the Poststructuralists. New York: Columbia University
 Press, 2014. xvii + 265 pp. Cloth, $45.00—The aim of this book is an
 important and far-reaching one: to facilitate a dialogue between two
 philosophical perspectives—one represented by Hegel and the other
 represented by two of Hegel's best known poststructuralist critics
 (Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze)—on the question of subjectivity. As
 Lumsden rightly notes, the question of subjectivity is bound to be at the
 center of any encounter between Hegel and the poststructuralists, since
 poststructuralist thinkers typically hold that Hegel represents the
 apotheosis of modern philosophy, and that a pernicious "metaphysics of
 subjectivity" lies at the heart of what is problematic about modern
 philosophy. But what if Hegel's thought is free of the metaphysics of
 subjectivity that the poststructuralists have so commonly attributed to
 him? In pursuing this question, Lumsden intends to show that Hegel's
 thought is more defensible than has commonly been acknowledged, and
 that Derrida and Deleuze misinterpret Hegel insofar as they fail to
 appreciate the ways in which Hegel's post-Kantian thought destabilizes
 the modern subject in much the same way that their own poststructuralist
 thought aims to do.
 In setting the scene for a dialogue between Hegel and poststructuralism,
 Lumsden quite rightly recognizes the important contribution of Martin
 Heidegger. As Lumsden explains, Heidegger's critique of Western
 philosophy's "metaphysics of presence" and its attendant "metaphysics of
 subjectivity" provides the framework for the poststructuralists' critique of
 modern philosophy and of Hegel as modernity's consummate
 spokesperson. Lumsden refreshingly avoids the unhelpful jargon of all
 too-many Heideggerians and provides as good an introduction as any to
 the basic concerns and arguments at work in Heidegger's critique of
 modernity and thus also at work in the subsequent, poststructuralist
 critiques of Hegel.
 Lumsden's explanation of how Derrida appropriates and transforms
 Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of presence is equally clear and
 reliable in its main outlines. At times, however, Lumsden seems to
 oversimplify Derrida's thinking, and thus tends to understate the real
 force of Derrida's critique of Hegel. According to Lumsden, Derrida's
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 interpretation and critique of Hegel is based on the idea that Hegel is a
 "robustly metaphysical" thinker who is animated by a "precritical monistic
 spirit," and whose concept of "spirit" is "an expanded version of self
 consciousness" and thus an instance of modernity's dubious metaphysics
 of subjectivity. Lumsden is correct, in my view, to say that such an
 interpretation of Hegel is an oversimplification that does not do justice to
 Hegel's thought. Yet Lumsden may be guilty of his own oversimplification
 when he suggests that the force of Derrida's critique of Hegel depends
 primarily on the critique of the metaphysics of presence as Lumsden has
 explained it in this book. Followers of Derrida will be likely to complain
 that Lumsden's explanation overlooks key elements in Derrida's thought
 (such as Derrida's very pro-Hegelian commitment to the strategy of
 "immanent critique"), and thus underappreciates the complexity of
 Derrida's grappling with Hegel. Similar concerns might also be raised
 about Lumsden's treatment of Deleuze. Lumsden correctly observes that
 Deleuze offers a novel approach to "difference," one in which "difference"
 operates as a kind of "transcendental empirical" that perpetually escapes
 containment by Hegel's systematic theorizing. But Lumsden spends no
 time in explaining or even acknowledging that Deleuze's account of
 "difference" emerged out of his radicalized rethinking of Bergson's equally
 radicalized notion of time. Because of this, Deleuzeans will surely be
 tempted to conclude that Lumsden does not fully appreciate the real
 uniqueness and subversiveness of Deleuze's challenge to Hegel.
 Summarizing one of his key claims, Lumsden notes: "It is . . . the
 contention of this book that once the significance of Hegel's response to
 the problems that beset Kant's critical philosophy is understood, a
 philosophical dialogue between Hegel and poststructuralism becomes
 possible. To date, such an exchange has not taken place." I believe that
 Lumsden is entirely correct to point out that Hegel's attempt to
 problematize the post-Kantian account of subjectivity (and also to
 problematize the related dualism of concept and intuition in Kant and
 Fichte) is quite similar to attempts by Derrida and Deleuze to
 problematize what they regard as the questionable metaphysics of
 presence and metaphysics of subjectivity in Hegel. Thus Lumsden has
 begun to make a potentially compelling case for the claim that if
 poststructuralist thinkers had understood Hegel more adequately, they
 might have recognized some of their own disruptive, problematizing
 strategies already at work in Hegel's thought. But I believe that Lumsden
 is wrong to say that the "dialogue" or "exchange" he is seeking to facilitate
 has, to date, "not taken place." For there already exists a fair amount of
 very suggestive secondary literature aiming to show how Hegel's critique
 of his predecessors can be understood as anticipating (and in some
 respects trumping) the poststructuralists' later critique of philosophies of
 subjectivity. (Some interesting contributors to this already existing
 secondary literature include John McCumber, John Russon, and Richard
 Dien Winfield, none of whom is mentioned in Lumsden's book.) One
 might thus say, in good poststructuralist fashion, that the dialogue which
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 for Lumsden "has not taken place" is actually a dialogue that has "always
 already" been going on, though in ways that unavoidably exceed and
 escape Lumsden's own and our own self-representations as individual
 subjectivities. —Michael Baur, Fordham University
 MAHAJAN, Sanjoy. The Art of Insight in Science and Engineering.
 Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2014. xvii + 349 pp. Paper, $30.00—
 The title of this book tantalizingly suggests that it is about the insights that
 science and engineering give us into nature and reality. However, such is
 not its purpose. The book is subtitled "Mastering Complexity," which
 suggests it may be about highly complex systems (such as climate and
 economic systems) and how to gain insight into them. That is not its
 purpose either, though this is closer to the mark. In order to understand
 the purpose of the book and its value, readers need to know something
 about how one masters any branch of science, but especially physical
 science. One of the reasons—some might say the main reason—that
 physics and engineering are difficult is not the mathematics per se; it is
 that most real world problems involve either equations that cannot be
 solved in closed form—that is, no exact answer can be found, or there is
 incomplete information. The student therefore must learn how to make
 approximations that keep the essential nature of the problem intact, but
 permit a solution. What can be neglected because it will not significantly
 affect the calculation, and what is really important? What assumptions
 can be made about missing data or knowledge of system dynamics? This
 kind of insight one gradually learns over many years of study and working
 problems. Of course it applies in many other fields of study as well—
 economics, population dynamics, and climatology, to mention a few. The
 purpose of Mahajan's book is to help students of science and engineering
 gain this insight. It should be noted that this insight has more of an
 analogical than a univocal character, which means that the ability to
 approximate in, say, quantum field theory is different from that in
 mechanics, though proficiency in one will aid the student in acquiring
 proficiency in the other.
 Mahajan organizes his book in three parts, corresponding to different
 ways of dealing with what he terms "complexity." Part one covers
 different ways of organizing complexity; part two discusses how to
 discard complexity without losing information; and part three talks about
 ways to discard complexity with loss of information. In all three parts,
 the subject is developed by solution of quantitative problems. There is
 very little theoretical or abstract discussion of the methods, and the
 reviewer did not find the connection between the examples and the
 chapter headings to be particularly obvious in most cases (though the
 worked-out examples were interesting). For example, part one is divided
 into two chapters, "Divide and Conquer" and "Abstraction." The
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